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UNITED STATES INFORMATION PERTAINING TO
THE TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
2010
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into
force on March 5, 1970. In 1995, the Parties indefinitely extended the Treaty, and
in doing so also provided for a conference to review the operation of the Treaty
every five years, with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the
NPT are being realized. From 3-28 May 2010, the NPT Parties will convene the
Treaty‟s Eighth Review Conference.
The NPT is the only legally binding agreement that provides on a global
basis a barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons and has the broadest support of any
arms control agreement in history. The Treaty has three interrelated and
interdependent objectives:
To stop the further spread of nuclear weapons;
To provide a sound basis for international cooperation in the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy; and
To commit all Parties to undertake negotiations in good faith on
disarmament.
These objectives are embedded in the Treaty‟s three mutually reinforcing
pillars.
This paper records U.S. actions in support of its obligation under the NPT, as
well as U.S. efforts to strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects, during the period
from 2000 to 2010. The United States has prepared this paper to assist the 2010
Review Conference in its efforts to review the operation of the NPT and to
strengthen the Treaty.
1
I.
PREVENTING THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
Articles I and II of the NPT seek to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons,
thereby strengthening the security of all states. Article I requires each nuclear
weapon State Party not to transfer nuclear weapons or other explosive devices to
any other recipient and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce non-nuclear
weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire such devices. Article II
requires each non-nuclear weapon State Party not to acquire or exercise control
over nuclear weapons or other explosive devices and not to seek or receive
assistance in the manufacture of such devices.
Article III requires the non-nuclear weapon States Parties to enter into an
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) setting out
safeguards to be applied to the nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities.
These “comprehensive safeguards” are intended to provide necessary assurance
that nuclear materials in non-nuclear weapon states are not diverted from peaceful
purposes to the development of nuclear explosive devices. In September 1997, the
IAEA Board of Governors adopted the Model Additional Protocol, which provides
the IAEA with additional tools to address diversion of declared as well as
undeclared nuclear material. More than 120 states have signed an Additional
Protocol (AP) with the Agency, and almost 100 have brought Protocols into force.
Article VII of the Treaty states: “[n]othing in this Treaty affects the right of any
group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of
nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” Five such treaties have been
concluded.
Article IX prescribes the steps that a state must take to accede to the Treaty.
Article X outlines the requirements for a Party to withdraw from the Treaty.
A. Article I: The Non-Proliferation Commitment by Nuclear Weapon States
Party
The United States takes seriously its Article I obligations as a Nuclear Weapon
State to not transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or nuclear
explosive devices or to assist or encourage any non-nuclear weapon state to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear explosive devices. Moreover, U.S. law,
2
policy and regulations are intended to prevent unauthorized transfers of nuclear
equipment, material, and technology. The United States has established and
implemented a comprehensive system of export controls for both nuclear and dual-
use items and technology that could be used for nuclear explosive purposes. This
system of export controls is designed to provide assurance that exports from the
United States of nuclear facilities, equipment, material and technology, including
nuclear-related dual-use items, are not diverted or misused for nuclear weapons
activities. These controls include:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission controls on exports of nuclear
reactors, equipment, components and materials under the U.S. Atomic
Energy Act, as amended (Act);
U.S. Department of Energy controls on exports of nuclear technology
transfers under the Act; and
U.S. Department of Commerce controls on exports of nuclear-related dual-
use commodities and technologies pursuant to the U.S. Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978.
The U.S. system of export controls is an essential element of U.S. compliance with
its obligations under Article I of the NPT and also under UN Security Council
Resolution 1540.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)
In April 2004, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, unanimously adopted Resolution 1540. UNSCR 1540 obligates all UN
Member States to develop and enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures
against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means
of delivery. Specifically, Resolution 1540 requires states to refrain from providing
support to non-state actors attempting to develop or in any way acquire WMD and
their means of delivery; to adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting non-state
actors from engaging in such activities; and to take and enforce effective measures
to establish domestic controls to prevent proliferation of WMD and their means of
delivery. The resolution established a Committee to implement its measures and
mandated reporting by Member States to the Committee on their implementation
of the resolution. Subsequent resolutions have extended the Committee‟s mandate.
3
Resolution 1540‟s implementation has prompted significant, positive steps across
the globe to prevent the development, use, and trafficking of WMD. Many
Member States have undertaken measures to forge new working relationships
among government entities, enhance regulatory frameworks, and expand their
efforts to address the nexus between non-state actors and WMD. Resolution 1540
has led to the development of new assistance vehicles for empowering UN
Member States to fulfill their obligations. Key international organizations,
including the IAEA, have adopted portions of the mandate of UNSCR 1540 to
guide their programs of work and to work in concert with the 1540 Committee and
Member States. The United States helped initiate UNSCR 1540 and has taken a
number of measures to advance its implementation.
In accordance with UNSCR 1540, the United States completed its National
Action Plan on May 31, 2006.
The United States is working to meet its obligations under Resolution 1540.
The United States has over many years has built an extensive legal and
regulatory framework addressing many 1540 requirements and continues to
strengthen that framework. For example, in June 2005, U.S. Executive
Order 13382 froze the U.S. assets of individuals or entities designated as
WMD proliferators and their supporters, and it prohibited U.S. persons from
engaging in transactions with those individuals or entities.
The United States has supported other states‟ efforts to implement
Resolution 1540 in a variety of ways, including providing technical
assistance and financial support. The United States spends more than $2
billion annually on programs designed to assist other states in developing
1540–related capacities. The United States and other States have initiated an
emerging process for matching requests for assistance with donors.
UN Security Council Resolution 1887(2009)
At a summit meeting chaired by President Obama on September 24, 2009, the
United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 1887. The
Resolution reaffirms that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery are threats to international peace and security and shows
agreement on a broad range of actions to address nuclear proliferation.
4
The Resolution has specific relevance for the 2010 Review Conference. It calls for
NPT Parties to cooperate so that the 2010 Review Conference results in a
strengthened Treaty and sets realistic and achievable goals in all of the NPT‟s three
pillars. It supports NPT universality and calls on all states to adhere to the NPT‟s
terms. It makes clear the Council‟s intent to address immediately any notice of
intent to withdraw from the Treaty and affirms that states will be held responsible
for any violations of the NPT committed prior to their withdrawal from the Treaty.
Further, the Resolution notes ongoing efforts in the NPT review process to identify
mechanisms for responding collectively to any notification of withdrawal.
Many of the Resolution‟s provisions are relevant to Parties‟ discussions at the
Review Conference as it supports:
A revitalized commitment to work toward a world without nuclear weapons
and further progress on nuclear arms reductions;
Key nuclear disarmament-related agreements, including a new Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT), and a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT);
Better security for nuclear materials to prevent their acquisition by terrorists;
Addressing the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime,
including demanding full compliance with relevant Security Council
resolutions and calling on states to find an early negotiated solution to cases
of noncompliance;
The IAEA‟s essential role in preventing nuclear proliferation and ensuring
access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy under effective safeguards;
Efforts to ensure the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a
framework that reduces proliferation risk;
The inalienable right of Parties to the NPT to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with their
nonproliferation obligations under the NPT;
Measures to reduce the likelihood that a peaceful nuclear program can be
diverted to a weapons program;
5
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THE TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
2010
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into
force on March 5, 1970. In 1995, the Parties indefinitely extended the Treaty, and
in doing so also provided for a conference to review the operation of the Treaty
every five years, with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the
NPT are being realized. From 3-28 May 2010, the NPT Parties will convene the
Treaty‟s Eighth Review Conference.
The NPT is the only legally binding agreement that provides on a global
basis a barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons and has the broadest support of any
arms control agreement in history. The Treaty has three interrelated and
interdependent objectives:
To stop the further spread of nuclear weapons;
To provide a sound basis for international cooperation in the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy; and
To commit all Parties to undertake negotiations in good faith on
disarmament.
These objectives are embedded in the Treaty‟s three mutually reinforcing
pillars.
This paper records U.S. actions in support of its obligation under the NPT, as
well as U.S. efforts to strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects, during the period
from 2000 to 2010. The United States has prepared this paper to assist the 2010
Review Conference in its efforts to review the operation of the NPT and to
strengthen the Treaty.
1
I.
PREVENTING THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
Articles I and II of the NPT seek to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons,
thereby strengthening the security of all states. Article I requires each nuclear
weapon State Party not to transfer nuclear weapons or other explosive devices to
any other recipient and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce non-nuclear
weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire such devices. Article II
requires each non-nuclear weapon State Party not to acquire or exercise control
over nuclear weapons or other explosive devices and not to seek or receive
assistance in the manufacture of such devices.
Article III requires the non-nuclear weapon States Parties to enter into an
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) setting out
safeguards to be applied to the nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities.
These “comprehensive safeguards” are intended to provide necessary assurance
that nuclear materials in non-nuclear weapon states are not diverted from peaceful
purposes to the development of nuclear explosive devices. In September 1997, the
IAEA Board of Governors adopted the Model Additional Protocol, which provides
the IAEA with additional tools to address diversion of declared as well as
undeclared nuclear material. More than 120 states have signed an Additional
Protocol (AP) with the Agency, and almost 100 have brought Protocols into force.
Article VII of the Treaty states: “[n]othing in this Treaty affects the right of any
group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of
nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” Five such treaties have been
concluded.
Article IX prescribes the steps that a state must take to accede to the Treaty.
Article X outlines the requirements for a Party to withdraw from the Treaty.
A. Article I: The Non-Proliferation Commitment by Nuclear Weapon States
Party
The United States takes seriously its Article I obligations as a Nuclear Weapon
State to not transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or nuclear
explosive devices or to assist or encourage any non-nuclear weapon state to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear explosive devices. Moreover, U.S. law,
2
policy and regulations are intended to prevent unauthorized transfers of nuclear
equipment, material, and technology. The United States has established and
implemented a comprehensive system of export controls for both nuclear and dual-
use items and technology that could be used for nuclear explosive purposes. This
system of export controls is designed to provide assurance that exports from the
United States of nuclear facilities, equipment, material and technology, including
nuclear-related dual-use items, are not diverted or misused for nuclear weapons
activities. These controls include:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission controls on exports of nuclear
reactors, equipment, components and materials under the U.S. Atomic
Energy Act, as amended (Act);
U.S. Department of Energy controls on exports of nuclear technology
transfers under the Act; and
U.S. Department of Commerce controls on exports of nuclear-related dual-
use commodities and technologies pursuant to the U.S. Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978.
The U.S. system of export controls is an essential element of U.S. compliance with
its obligations under Article I of the NPT and also under UN Security Council
Resolution 1540.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)
In April 2004, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, unanimously adopted Resolution 1540. UNSCR 1540 obligates all UN
Member States to develop and enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures
against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means
of delivery. Specifically, Resolution 1540 requires states to refrain from providing
support to non-state actors attempting to develop or in any way acquire WMD and
their means of delivery; to adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting non-state
actors from engaging in such activities; and to take and enforce effective measures
to establish domestic controls to prevent proliferation of WMD and their means of
delivery. The resolution established a Committee to implement its measures and
mandated reporting by Member States to the Committee on their implementation
of the resolution. Subsequent resolutions have extended the Committee‟s mandate.
3
Resolution 1540‟s implementation has prompted significant, positive steps across
the globe to prevent the development, use, and trafficking of WMD. Many
Member States have undertaken measures to forge new working relationships
among government entities, enhance regulatory frameworks, and expand their
efforts to address the nexus between non-state actors and WMD. Resolution 1540
has led to the development of new assistance vehicles for empowering UN
Member States to fulfill their obligations. Key international organizations,
including the IAEA, have adopted portions of the mandate of UNSCR 1540 to
guide their programs of work and to work in concert with the 1540 Committee and
Member States. The United States helped initiate UNSCR 1540 and has taken a
number of measures to advance its implementation.
In accordance with UNSCR 1540, the United States completed its National
Action Plan on May 31, 2006.
The United States is working to meet its obligations under Resolution 1540.
The United States has over many years has built an extensive legal and
regulatory framework addressing many 1540 requirements and continues to
strengthen that framework. For example, in June 2005, U.S. Executive
Order 13382 froze the U.S. assets of individuals or entities designated as
WMD proliferators and their supporters, and it prohibited U.S. persons from
engaging in transactions with those individuals or entities.
The United States has supported other states‟ efforts to implement
Resolution 1540 in a variety of ways, including providing technical
assistance and financial support. The United States spends more than $2
billion annually on programs designed to assist other states in developing
1540–related capacities. The United States and other States have initiated an
emerging process for matching requests for assistance with donors.
UN Security Council Resolution 1887(2009)
At a summit meeting chaired by President Obama on September 24, 2009, the
United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 1887. The
Resolution reaffirms that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery are threats to international peace and security and shows
agreement on a broad range of actions to address nuclear proliferation.
4
The Resolution has specific relevance for the 2010 Review Conference. It calls for
NPT Parties to cooperate so that the 2010 Review Conference results in a
strengthened Treaty and sets realistic and achievable goals in all of the NPT‟s three
pillars. It supports NPT universality and calls on all states to adhere to the NPT‟s
terms. It makes clear the Council‟s intent to address immediately any notice of
intent to withdraw from the Treaty and affirms that states will be held responsible
for any violations of the NPT committed prior to their withdrawal from the Treaty.
Further, the Resolution notes ongoing efforts in the NPT review process to identify
mechanisms for responding collectively to any notification of withdrawal.
Many of the Resolution‟s provisions are relevant to Parties‟ discussions at the
Review Conference as it supports:
A revitalized commitment to work toward a world without nuclear weapons
and further progress on nuclear arms reductions;
Key nuclear disarmament-related agreements, including a new Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT), and a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT);
Better security for nuclear materials to prevent their acquisition by terrorists;
Addressing the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime,
including demanding full compliance with relevant Security Council
resolutions and calling on states to find an early negotiated solution to cases
of noncompliance;
The IAEA‟s essential role in preventing nuclear proliferation and ensuring
access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy under effective safeguards;
Efforts to ensure the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a
framework that reduces proliferation risk;
The inalienable right of Parties to the NPT to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with their
nonproliferation obligations under the NPT;
Measures to reduce the likelihood that a peaceful nuclear program can be
diverted to a weapons program;
5